Global crisis forms new economic policy agenda which raises new questions for economic theory and economic thinking. This paper deals with these new intellectual challenges. Among them: growth theory and the risks of secular stagnation, unconventional macroeconomic policy and the prospects trends, the paper discusses the roots and features of current Russian economic problems, compares the includes the effects of sanctions against Russia on the current economic situation and the structural problems that slow down economic growth. Special attention is paid to examples of medium-term and long-term steps that can provide sustainable development for the Russian economy.
a single category and compared, even if the anti-crisis policies that were effective in one case do not apply in another. We consider the distinguishing features of a systemic crisis to be the following.
A systemic crisis is both cyclical and structural. It involves fundamental institutional and technological changes, that is, a transformation of the technological base (which some -tion for emerging from the crisis. 1 -structural and institutional reforms to steer the economy back onto a trajectory of sustainable growth.
The consequence of a systemic crisis is the formation of a new economic growth -gence of new branches and sectors of the productive economy, and their geographical relocation throughout the world, is creating a new global economic reality that poses new challenges that require the adoption of new instruments of economic policy. This trend is 2010; Ulyukaev, 2010) .
of power (involving both countries and regions) are achieved on a global scale. In the early stages of the present crisis, it was assumed that this would result in the consolidation of a bi-polar world centered around the United States and China, sometimes referred to as the gradually but ever more distinctly beginning to see the formation of a multi-polar world in which two or three key economic centers predominate but that resembles a return to the wellbalance interests. With adjustments to take present-day circumstances into account, we could speak of a balance of interests among regional power groupings.
During the course of a systemic crisis, important changes take place in the regulation of socio-economic processes. During the 1930s, the transition to a phase of industrial -stage of technological development. At the beginning of the current crisis, it seemed that the -lished itself. Certainly, there has been an increase in state regulation, but it seems to have mechanisms have remained national. In the absence of a system of global governance, there 1 will evolve in the aftermath of the present crisis is not yet clear. If there is a consolidation of regional groupings in the global balance of power, this might be accompanied by a strengthening of the Chinese yuan or of regional reserve currencies. A proliferation of reserve currencies could contribute to the emergence of a multi-polar world and encourage increased accountability by the corresponding monetary authorities (to the extent that the reserve currencies would compete with each other).
A new economic doctrine has been formulated, that is, a new orthodoxy in thinkAll of the above have important implications for understanding how to overcome a systemic crisis and manage the processes involved. A systemic crisis poses a profound intellectual challenge: a fundamental examination of its causes and development is needed, as are the means for overcoming it. Just as generals are always preparing by looking at wars of the past, so politicians and economists tend to think in terms of crises of the past. This might be appropriate as long as the problem seems to be the business cycle. This is Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon), who decided not to interfere in the natural course of events, maintaining a strictly balanced budget and strengthening the monetary system based on the gold standard. As the experience of the preceding 100 years seemed to show, crises usually lasted only a year, and no special policy was needed to bring them to an end. Similarly, in the 1970s, the methods applied at the beginning of the crisis were those of conventional Keynesian regulation (budget stimulation during decelerating growth rates and even, during the administration of Richard Nixon, government price controls), but this In fact, systemic crises cannot be dealt with by applying the economic policies of preceding decades. Too many new problems arise, and it is unclear from the outset what mechanisms are driving the crisis, what is its scale, how long it will last, and how it can be overcome. In the twentieth century, it usually took around ten years to overcome a systemic crisis. Paul Volcker drew attention to this circumstance in July 1979, in the midst of the last systemic A systemic crisis cannot be understood merely as a recession, as an increase in unemploysectors of the economy and, in particular, countries and regions. It lasts for approximately or even adequately describe the economic processes at work. While technological renewal methods in use fail to adequately describe the emergence of new sectors in the economy.
Problems also arise with employment statistics. An increase in employment is one of the a systemic crisis, this increase is apparent only at the very end. Technological renewal makes take place in the labor market. This means that during the emergence from a systemic crisis, an employment recovery will be delayed, and there will be high unemployment even as the new economy, and some time is required before they are able to do so. Finally, a systemic crisis cannot be overcome merely by macroeconomic policy or macroeconomic regulation, whatever the magnitude of budgetary, monetary, and credit problems might be. A responsible macroeconomic policy should not lose sight of the imeconomic system.
A systemic crisis may be described as a period innovation in that it involves the emergence (before, during, and after the crisis) of new economic and political institutions, the arrival of a new generation of political leaders, entrepreneurs and experts, and the construction of previous systemic crisis. Such a crisis is resolved only after the advances and transformations have been resolved. We are referring primarily to:
(secular stagnation); new challenges in macroeconomic policy involving the widespread application of nontraditional methods (particularly in the sphere of money circulation); the problem of inequality in the context of the emergence of a new model of economic growth, which is bound up with the problems from the lengthy slow-down that precedes economic recovery; a revision of our understanding of the theory and institutions of the welfare state in order day economic policy and of the practical measures currently being applied. During the years 1980 -2000, the priorities were economic growth and macroeconomic stability, and the main countries (Williamson, 1989) . We do not deny the importance of macroeconomic stability, tools with which to manage economic development.
Stimulating economic growth
In the decade before the crisis, the world experienced unprecedentedly high growth rates. It was considered that they were the result of the new methods of political and economic -thorities (especially in the United States) were reluctant to restrict growth in lending, which the developed and developing countries. Now growth has slowed down, and this has raised a number of questions.
consist primarily of particular instruments of monetary policy (quantitative easing , low interest rates, etc.), or do we mean that as a result of these policies a sustainable period of low problems (that are an integral part of the crisis that has not yet been overcome), or are they a characteristic feature of a future, post-crisis model of economic development? 2 There is a related question concerning the growth prospects for emerging economies and, especially, for the countries that were expected to produce an economic miracle. The very 8  Table 1 GDP growth rates, 1990 -2013 (%).
Share of global GDP, 2013 GDP, 1990 GDP, 1991 GDP, 1992 GDP, 1993 GDP, 1994 GDP, 1995 GDP, 1996 GDP, 1997 GDP, 1998 GDP, 1999 GDP, 2000 GDP, 2001 GDP, 2002 GDP, 2003 GDP, 2004 GDP, 2005 GDP, 2006 GDP, 2007 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2009 GDP, 2010 GDP, 2011 GDP, 2012 GDP, 2013 World 3.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.2 2.5 3.6 4.8 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.4 4.9 5.6 5.7 3.0 0.0 5.4 4.1 3.4 3.3 Advanced economies 43.62 3.3 1.5 2.3 1.5 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 3.2 2.8 3.1 2.8 0.1 -3.4 3.1 1.7 1.2 1.4
United States 16.45 1.9 -0.1 3.6 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.8 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.1 1.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.3 2.7 1.8 -0.3 -2.8 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 Japan 4.58 5.6 3.3 0.8 0.2 0.9 1.9 2.6 1.6 -2.0 -0.2 2.3 0.4 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 -1.0 -5.5 4.7 -0.5 1.5 1.5 Germany 3.45 5.7 5.0 1.5 -1.0 2.5 1.8 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 3.3 1.6 0.0 -0.4 0.7 0.9 3.9 3.4 0.8 -5.1 3.9 3.4 0.9 0.5 UK 2.28 1.8 -1.3 1.3 3.5 5.0 3.5 3.5 4.4 3.6 2.9 4.4 2.2 2.3 3.9 3.2 3.2 2.8 3.4 -0.8 -5.2 1.7 1.1 0.3 1.7 France 2.49 2.9 1.0 1.6 -0.6 2.3 2.1 1.4 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.9 2.0 1.1 0.8 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.4 0.2 -2.9 2.0 2.1 0.3 0.3 Italy 2.00 2.1 1.4 0.8 -0.9 2.2 2.9 1.1 1.9 1.4 1.5 3.7 1.9 0.5 0.0 1.7 0.9 2.2 1.7 -1.2 -5.5 1.7 0.4 -2.4 -1. the expectation of dynamic growth in these countries. Initially, the acceleration in the development of emerging markets gave rise to expectations of a gradual convergence of the developed and developing economies. It was envisaged -ternational experience), less developed countries would achieve more rapid growth (Fig. 1) . menon, emerging markets even aspired to become safe havens where Western companies -the Western world (including Japan) that had led to the crisis.
A debate ensued over the extent to which emerging economies could repeat their successes of the previous 20 years in the foreseeable future. A hypothesis was put forward that the high growth rates of these countries during these years were anomalous and that a correction would follow that would bring them back to the levels of the 1970s and 1980s ( Åslund, 2013) . concept of GDP was devised, there have been concerns about how it could be accurately measured. Particular problems arise during periods of structural change, that is, during periods of systemic (structural) crises. Renewal of the economic system drastically affects the reliability that had been formulated to address pre-existing economic realities. At the present time, the information and biotechnology sectors plus new material production fall into this category. level of development during a systemic crisis can take place, especially at the stage when the crisis is coming to an end. What light do the experiences of recent years shed upon these problems? The economic trends from 2008-2013 do not allow us to unambiguously conclude that the world has embarked upon a period of long-term low growth rates, and even less so that we have entered a period of long-term stagnation (secular stagnation). One can posit that such a model is made. Notwithstanding a slow-down in the world economy in 2012-2013, average growth rates during this period, while lower than during the 2000s, have nevertheless been in line with the average annual GDP growth rates throughout the world during the 1990s (Fig. 2) . It is therefore premature to speak of long-term stagnation.
period (by comparison with the 1990s) and during the post-crisis period. The contribution rates slowed down noticeably during 2012-2013. Their pre-eminence is due, as in the past, to the performance of Asian economies. The share of developing countries in global GDP is increasing, thanks to high growth rates in the developing countries of Asia. The group of dynamically growing developing countries has also been expanding, thanks in particular to the performance of Latin American economies.
The economic debate over long-term stagnation addresses several issues. 4 -cerned with whether long-term stagnation affects potential or real GDP. The factors contributing to decreasing rates of potential GDP growth have been known since the 1980s, and they were at work during the entire period of rapid economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s. They include the following:
slowing rates of population growth in developed countries (in a number of countries there population aging and, in nearly all developed counties, reaching the natural limit in the portion of the population with higher education; the development of outsourcing and the transfer of industrial production from developed to developing countries; an increase in opportunity costs deriving from environmental issues.
other factors account for slowing growth rates for total factor productivity.
5 growth in the services sector; stimulation of a consumption-based culture; an extension of the age at which people actively work; and a redistribution of value added in the production of new products between the developed and developing countries to the advantage of the former, even while physical production was located in the latter. Over and above all of this, in the measurement of potential quality of growth. The factors that have contributed to the reduced rates of growth in actual GDP in recent years include the excessive burden of public and private debt on the economy, restrictions on immigration in the advanced countries, and completion of the effect of the technological cycle associated with the development of information and computer technology (IT).
A second issue in the debate over long-term stagnation addresses the question of whether this phenomenon affects all countries or only the developed ones. In listing the factors that contribute to slowing economic growth, we have referred in almost all cases to the group a ripple effect on the growth rates of developing countries. The principal mechanisms producing this effect are the outsourcing of production, the fact that the greatest volume of which, during global decline in economic activity, tends to redirect capital from developing countries into risk-free assets (that is, into assets in the developed countries).
The dynamic of the real GDP of the developed countries has a direct impact on the real GDP of developing countries. 5 On long-term problems of growth deceleration see Gordon, 2012 Gordon, , 2014 . The third issue concerns the convergence of living standards. As the work of Dani Rodrik has shown (Rodrik, 2011b) , there was a steady, long-term trend toward a convergence in living standards in different countries until approximately the middle of the twentieth century. After this time, inter-country inequality did not decline and in some cases even increased. In fact, there has been a marked trend toward increasing differentiation between developing countries in this respect. On the one hand, a fairly large group composed of the largest dehas been steadily catching up with the developed countries. This is according to indicators -ferent countries. Judged by these criteria, the hypothesis regarding convergence, taking into of developing countries, including those with relatively low incomes, have low rates of economic growth that are unstable over long time periods, which prevents them from catching up with the developed countries. In the case of these countries, the hypothesis of convergence
New trends in macroeconomic policy
The governments of the developed countries have resorted to macroeconomic measures -for increasing liquidity to instruments for funding the operations of commercial banks, and acceptable, although the questions of whether they will be effective in the long term and First, we need to understand how long the policy of quantitative easing can be applied and the extent to which ending this policy will result in reducing growth rates and possibly risking a recession. Second, the long-term consequences of such a monetary policy, which to -are unknown. In the present circumstances, there is a risk of being caught in an unusual mone tary policy trap: governments will respond to low rates of growth by reducing interest Running in parallel is the debate over the appropriateness and viability of a soft budgetary policy. The majority of developed countries have responded to high levels of debt and/or -countries have refrained from introducing such measures. What is also unclear is whether budgetary policy can be used to stimulate economic growth (this is the debate over the role of budgetary austerity). The governments of some cyclical measures of increased budgetary expenditure. There is no consensus regarding the effectiveness of this policy.
ment in economic performance. This is at least the experience of the United Kingdom and the has been a reduction in unemployment and an increase in growth rates.
budgetary restraint have been the most successful, politically and economically (this includes countries that have not sought to balance their budgets (primarily France and Italy) are on the brink of recession.
At the same time, the majority of countries that sharply increased public expenditures monetary policy the key dilemma is how to move away from the unconventional forms of -cial markets. It seems that the regulators in developed countries will proceed with extreme caution in implementing anti-crisis measures, reducing the volume of support proportionate to the recovery in economic activity and growth in the money multiplier.
In the debate over current macro-economic policy and growth stimulation, four topics stand out. First, the measures being implemented are anti-crisis measures, that is, they are primarily directed toward mitigating the crisis and do not contribute to solving the structural problems that gave rise to the crisis. This is abundantly clear from the fact that demand for credit is extremely low, even where there are negative interest rates. In other words, the low technological, and, in some cases, socio-political).
Second, notwithstanding the current fashion for macro-economic experimentation, the -Third, the policy of quantitative easing is being most successfully applied in those countdemand throughout the world. Fourth, these extraordinary measures cannot automatically be applied by other countries, least of all by developing countries. The scope for adopting soft budgetary and monetary circumstances of a particular country and by the amount of credibility the policy of that country enjoys.
The standard principles and techniques of macroeconomic management remain relevant for emerging markets. If they apply a non-standard monetary policy, the risks for their economies will be much greater.
One important lesson to be learned from the experience of developed countries is that dangerous for developing countries to draw the conclusion that they can abandon the basic stability and the creation of a favorable investment climate.
economic activity than was previously thought. Against this background, some of the guidelines and goals of economic policies that are intended to stimulate growth must also be changed.
should be increased from 2% to approximately 4%. This represents a substantial change in our understanding of the macroeconomic foundations of economic growth.
the introduction of currency controls (particularly for capital account transactions), in spemanifests itself not in the scale but in the high volatility of cross-border capital movements. Neither developed nor developing countries are willing -mies. It can be dealt with by tightening controls or by reducing taxation. The second problem mainly affects developing countries where political regimes are unstable or where the business environment is poor. In this case, repressive measures can be applied, but it is preferable to improve the quality of the business environment. Otherwise, any concerted measures taken offs in each individual case. 
IMF.
Finally, in the debates over economic growth prospects, there are changes in the understanding of the problem of inequality. Whereas during recent decades this topic has been -tion (Piketty, 2014) .
Two new sets of circumstances have drawn attention to this issue. First, the theoretidevelopment has been reached, further development will attenuate the problem of inequality .
would appear that in cases where the welfare of the population has increased proportionately with the growth of the economy, political upheaval has been avoided. This is in contrast twentieth centuries. It has also been noted that the liberal economic model that has prevailed since the 1980s attaches priority to achieving economic growth on the assumption that this will automatically lead to improvements in the welfare of all, irrespective of whether overall economic -ever, research over the last 10 years indicates that contemporary developed societies have economic growth. 6 Clearly, these questions will be at the center of political and economic relevant it is to the relationship between economic growth and levels of inequality in cases where developed countries depart from the traditional industrial society and undergo radical structural change.
Globalization and global imbalances
taneously been a contributing factor toward economic growth and a consequence of that growth. It has also been linked to both socio-economic successes and socio-economic failures . The unprecedented economic growth during the 1990s, the global crisis that erupted in 2008, and social stagnation that has been accompanied by growing inequality have all been -continue in the post-crisis period.
and at the beginning of the recent global crisis, a number of economists took the view that global imbalances were the principal factors underlying the crisis. Attention was drawn, in particular, to the division of the world between countries that consumed and countries that (arguably in the West as a whole) with the powerful propensity to save in China and other developing Asian countries.
One need to understand whether these imbalances can be overcome or whether, after some attenuation, they will once again increase for reasons that might include the application of anti-crisis measures (above all, the policy of quantitative easing), which themselves are world market by means of global regulation. 7 We know that where there is socio-economic progress, increased welfare leads to an increase in the cost of labor in the leading developing countries. These countries have become less competitive relative to developed countries, at least with regard to labor costs. This trend, combined with the latest technological development (reduction in the share of physical labor world trade (Ulyukaev, 2014) . Now these countries will have to consider institutional improvements in the business environ ment if they are to remain competitive. The importance of exchanging goods between countries is diminishing, as is, correspondingly, the distinction between countries that conon supporting exports (which is, of course, important, and support can even be increased) but on improving the quality of the business environment, irrespective of the markets particular businesses serve. Moreover, as the level of welfare in developing countries increases, the domestic markets in these countries will become not less but more important for their growth prospects than the markets of developed countries.
In this way, increased costs in the emergency economies (principally labor costs), on the one hand, and increased internal demand, on the other, can become contributing factors in slowing the rate of growth in world trade and even in promoting a certain reduction in world trade turnover.
beginning of the twentieth century, there have been several phases of advance and retreat in 8 -important trends, some of which may be long-term. They are related to the dynamics of the of the 2000s and the slowing during the 2010s, we need to take into account the price factor 7 and has been a boon to hundreds of millions of poor workers in China and elsewhere in Asia, it rests on shaky pillars. Unlike national markets, which tend to be supported by domestic regulatory and political institutions, global regulator, no global safety nets, and, of course, no global democracy. In other words, global markets suffer from in Rodrik (2011a. Ch. 10) . See also Ulyukaev (2014. Ch. 1). 8 an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August, 1914! could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial (Keynes, 1919 . Ch. 2). and the effect of double accounting. In other words, rapid changes in the prices for raw matewas observable in 2012-2013 was probably due to a weakness in demand and deterioration There was some contraction in the volume of direct cross-border investments, but there is no single explanation for this. The large-scale growth in these investments was one of the main features of world economic development toward the end of the 1990s and 2000s and the level that has been attained: the average annual volume of global foreign direct investments (FDI) from 2005-2012 was approximately 1.5 trillion USD. The relationship between developed and developing countries as recipients in the aggregate volume of investments is changing: whereas the share of developing countries in all world FDIs was 20% in 2000, it was 50% in 2009 and 60% in 2012. In the post-crisis period, the level of investment in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America has recovered and even increased. The developed countries remain the principal provider of foreign investments, although their share dominate as before.
At the same time, the cross-border movement of capital between advanced countries has their aggregate GDP, this amount has now fallen below 4.5%, and for the entire world econosome economists interpret this as a strengthening in the stability of the world economy and as be a long-term slow-down in economic development.
propagation of protectionist ideology, albeit not in the crude form of trade restrictions and high tariffs, which would be in violation of WTO requirements. Such measures, introduced increase in the number of free-trade agreements (Fig. 6) . It is likely that the WTO system unanimity principle as countries begin to form groups for particular purposes, including speadvanced countries. The real magnitude of the contemporary economy, and thus its external economic activity, is measured not so much by the volume of exports and imports as by the amount of value added within the system of global value chains (GVCs). It is vital when developing a foreign economic strategy that is appropriate for present-day conditions, to insert the economy into these chains, to increase the share of value added created by national companies and the competitiveness of national production, and to employ such methods as locating production mechanisms of foreign economic trade, as a factor contributing to economic growth, will
The regulation of foreign trade must change, as must attitudes toward imports. Strategies based on export-oriented growth and protection against imports are no longer compatible. In both spheres, the key issue becomes the international competitiveness of produc tion. The very concept of protectionism must change. Rather than think in terms in terms of defending trans-national producers and supporting their interests throughout the global value chain. This means that border and internal barriers, the management of techno logy, the defense of intellectual property rights, competition, and access to the markets of countries that participate in the value chain will become important instruments for supporting national companies and enhancing their competitive advantage. The protection the global chains of value creation.
The trend toward re-industrialization
industry in GDP and employment in these countries has generally been falling, and this has also been the case in post-Communist Russia. Critics of contemporary capitalism have dethe formation of a post-industrial economy and society.
ing cost of labor in developing countries is not necessarily the most important. After all, there are many poor and relatively stable countries to where production can be relocated be understood not as the reintroduction of traditional forms of production in the developed countries but as the formation of new branches of industry. The distinguishing feature is a relative reduction of labor in the cost structure and an increase in the weight of factors such as the proximity of the research base (given the increased proportion of R&D costs) and basic consumer demand). The increasing cost of labor in the emerging economies, has -cost of energy, and this can be attributed both to recent technological innovations in the exof transportation.
No less important is the proximity of the sales market. Nowadays when products are increasingly targeted at individual consumption, the proximity of the consumer has become an important factor in acquiring a competitive advantage. The proximity of developers of new products and technologies has also gained increasing importance, especially in the advanced countries. The analysis of new industries will also gain increasing importance as a means of identifying new technologies that will drive economic growth in the post-crisis period.
ber of examples (mainly in the United States) of a return to production by industrial enterprises that were closed down many years ago. One example is the revival of pipeline production for the shale oil and gas industries in the United States.
In these circumstances, industrial policy must acquire a new rationale. It should no longer sectors or enterprises but rather of creating an institutional framework that will be conducive to the emergence of new sectors of the economy.
Causes and components of the Russian crisis
half of 2014 to 48-49 USD/bbl on certain days in December 2014 and January 2015). In December, the exchange rate of the Russian national currency fell by approximately 50%, and real income of the population is decreasing, and GDP growth rates are likely to be negative in
The events that occurred around the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 were a most vivid manifestation of the more general problems directly impacting the possibility of sethe 2014-2015 situation is far different in terms of its nature and mechanisms from previous crises suffered by the Russian economy.
The crisis faced by Russia in 1998 was primarily a standard debt crisis fueled by a lack of monetary policy. As is known from theory (Krugman, 1979) , such a combination of factors
The drop in oil prices, which reached the bottom after a 75% drop in the nominal ruble rate (winter of 1998-1999) , had a restricted effect on the development of the crisis. If oil prices had not dropped, the debt and the currency crises might have occurred somewhat later, but they could not be avoided without balancing the budget and maintaining an equilibrium ex-(see : Mau, 1998; Ulyukaev, 1999) . Such crisis characteristics in developing countries required well-known countermeasures.
incided with the end of the transformation crisis, i.e., the transition from a planned system end of the 1990s, Russia was through with economic and political troubles (downturns), and in fact, the nature of the economic recession as such was quite simple and well-known from and developing). Therefore, an important factor for the bailout was restoring political and macroeconomic stability, and the growth was fueled by the huge production and human capiIn 2008 and 2009, the crisis in Russia developed in economic terms according to a more sophisticated model with both internal and external components. On the one hand, it was a global economic crisis that was especially apparent in developed countries. In the autumn of 2008, ensuing slump in global demand for the basic commodities of Russian export, pri marily raw commodities and their primary processing products (part of the investment demand).
On the other hand, by the middle of 2008, signs appeared of a crisis in the growth model that had been used in the 2000s and that was based on demand expansion (determined in the case in question by rapid growth in the rental income from the fuel and energy sectors). The fall in oil prices from 145 to 37 USD/bbl during 2008-2009 was critical for the economy, unemployment below the natural rate, an overvalued exchange rate for the national currency, prices returned to a reasonable level (at the end of 2009).
In 2014 and 2015, Russia faced three crisis components simultaneously: structural, cyclical (internal market), and external.
First, this is a crisis in structural growth rates, which conventionally implies potential growth rates at the existing level of technologies and entrepreneurship (the total factor productivity, TFP), with a full effective (considering the existing spare capacity, the technical and --nomic Policy, the structural rates of Russian GDP growth fell from approximately 4.0-5.0% annually during the 2000s to 1.0-1.5% in 2014, and are expected to continue decreasing in 3-4 p.p. of GDP growth per year (Sinelnikov-Murylev et al., 2014) .
Second, this is also an internal cyclical business crisis. The characteristic features of this type of crisis are the following: a decrease in the growth rates of investments; a slowdown debts for banks; an expansion of consumer demand by the population, as fueled by consum--Third, the current crisis is connected with changes in external economic conditions (a trend reversal in oil prices). The tenuous point of fact that the crisis of 2008-2009 was apparently overcome without serious consequences was, in fact, due to the continuance of the previous Russian economic growth model, under which high growth rates are possible half of 2014 at approximately 100 USD/bbl had already noticeably reduced the contribucontribution in 2015.
It is true, however, that unlike 2009, the demand for exports and world prices for other Russian commodities, apart from oil, are practically unchanged, which compensates to some an absence of any additional negative impact on the economy and even on individual sectors.
Furthermore, there has been an external shock due to the sanctions imposed on Russia, -growth that are already having a negative effect, which will persist for two to three years. Among them is the increased economic and political uncertainty, an increase in the cost of borrowed funds, and restrictions on technology transfer as well as imports. sharp increase in uncertainty in the economy and in politics, which affects decision-making by economic agents both within the country Consumption. The increase in economic and political uncertainty creates uncertainty about future income. As a result, according to the permanent income hypothesis, economic agents lower consumption in the present by augmenting savings to be able to level out potential made mainly in the form of foreign cash. This decreases the demand for real cash balances in rubles (due to the components of the transactional demand and the demand for a store of value) and increases the demand for real cash balances in foreign currency (due to the demand for a store of value and for precaution).
celeration. These processes could already be distinctly observed in the 1st and 4th quarters reductions in the volumes of bank deposits and people started converting their savings from bank accounts to currency in cash and safe-deposit boxes (see Table 3 ).
Investments. The increased uncertainty about future income and output volumes raises the current cost of holding of capital and reduces its desired future volume. The investments needed to achieve this volume fall as a result, and businesses are only willing to implement those projects for which the guaranteed return exceeds the current increased cost of capital (interest). In this case, we speak precisely about increasing the risk premium within the interest rate, subjectively perceived by economic agents, as an indicator of the relative return on (cost of) capital between the present and the future. Decreasing the nominal interest rate 22 choose to save money on accounts or in the form of liquid assets rather than make new investand nominal rates at the end of 2014 had practically no effect on the lending volumes in the the demand for ruble loans even increased due to replacing foreign currency loans (Fig. 7) .
to decrease the investment risks in real projects, the level of nominal rates will again become important on the lending market.
Let us recall that the diametrically opposed monetary policy pursued by several central about similar results in terms of encouraging investment lending. Despite the extremely low or even negative interest rates, economic agents were unwilling to take out loans due to the term funds were borrowed in previous years on the external market, Russian borrowers suffered not only from the direct increase in rates but also from the increased foreign exchange risk for loans in foreign currency. First, this channel reduces investment opportunities for businesses willing to make investments at the present moment, despite the mechanism of reducing the desired capital volume described above; second, it limits opportunities for re- decline in the total factor productivity because there is no access to technology transfer from abroad and because of the reduction in foreign direct investments and the deterioration of competition with foreign producers (the latter on account of restrictions on foreign trade transactions on either side and the impact of price advantages due to the drop in the ruble exchange rate). At the same time, the total factor productivity appears to be the only tool that can increase the structural annual economic growth rates from the present 1.0-1.5% range to at least 3.0-3.5%. the effects from import restrictions the production of individual goods crucially depends on imported components that cannot be replaced, at least in the near term, for technical or technological reasons. This effect will persist regardless of whether this restriction is due to discrete decisions with respect to certain product categories or is the result of increased prices for imported goods due to devaluation. In particular, research shows that output trends will be materially affected by a decline in the real ruble exchange rate for sectors such as pharmaceuticals, automobiles, textiles, apparel production, plastics and plastic products, equipment, electrical equipment and machinery, goods produced in Russia is often due to the increased prices for components or raw materials because of the ruble depreciation.
though not yet strongly demonstrated, can be restrictions on Russian exports of certain types because of the numerous technical restrictions regarding the export geography, reductions in the physical volume of exports for such goods will rapidly have an adverse effect on the 8. Medium-term economic growth restraints or if oil prices increase to a level comfortable for Russia (approximately 80-100 USD/bbl), the Russia is conventionally regarded as a raw-material-producing nation whose welfare rests is extensively expanding hydrocarbon exports to China and Southeast Asia. In 2014, Russia set a record for oil production (528 million tons). Oil and gas account for 2 / 3 of exports, and revenues from the extractive sector account for over 50% of the federal budget income.
in 2005, at approximately 25% of the GDP. Since that time, it has gradually reduced to 21% of the GDP (beginning of 2014) (see: Dmitriev and Drobyshevsky, 2015) . Indeed, since 2005, the oil production output has remained practically unchanged, at approximately 500 million tons per year. In other words, the real output in this sector has not grown for nearly 10 years, whereas the GDP has grown, apparently due to development in other industries and the service sector. There are no grounds to expect any growth in the physical output of the extraction sector in the years to come. According to our estimates, by 2020, the share of the oil and gas sector will not be above 18.0-18.5% of the GDP, or 25% less than in 2005. Moreover, oil and gas are not the only raw commodities Russia exports. After hydrocarbons, metals (ferrous and non-ferrous) are the next most common, accounting for approximately 20% of total exports.
Another conventional factor promoting economic growth is domestic consumer demand. a huge debt burden (Fig. 8) . 9 Although loans to the population make up only 17% of the GDP, due to short average loan terms, a small proportion of long-term mortgage loans, and high nominal interest rates, Russians spend approximately 13% of their disposable income on total approximately 70% of the GDP but where debt servicing costs are near 10% of income. In other words, even after the country overcomes the acute phase of the current crisis, further expansion of consumer demand by means of lending is not economically viable and bears serious risks.
income (wages) is also unlikely. After the decline in the ruble exchange rate during the secversus countries in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, demographic issues will soon raise wages again, and the income of hired employees will increase. At the same time, it is evident that economic advancement is impossible if labor costs continue growing, and thus, it will be neces sary to restructure sectors and to release and shift the labor force. This makes employees more restrained about their future income and more inclined to save (in whatever form).
Third, the inconsistent policy toward developing the pension system drives people to consider providing for themselves on their own after retiring, which also encourages saving. Of Thus, in the near-future, the population will be net savers repaying their debts rather than From the perspective of state stimulation of demand, there are also restrictions in the medium-term, although in the short-run, public spending can be expected to be augmented by the means of the anti-crisis package.
paid off external debts, ensured a federal budget surplus, and formed sovereign funds amid a favorable external environment. In 2009-2010, thanks to the previously accumulated rewhile keeping government debt at a minimum (approximately 10% of the GDP). In 2012, it achieved has begun to face serious challenges.
First, the revenue base of the budget has been reduced. As noted above, taxes on the oil and gas sector bring in more than 50% of the federal budget income, and the share of the oil and gas sector in GDP is shrinking. Revenues in the oil and gas sector are increasingly coming from tax revenues from the oil and gas sector would still be expected to decrease by 1.0-1.5 p.p. of the GDP by 2016. Under an unfavorable business climate, tax revenues from the oil and gas -tax revenues. Reducing average oil prices to 60-80 USD/bbl in 2016-2017 will add another -valuation of the national currency.
Second, there is no certainty about pension reform, a key factor for ensuring budgetary, social, and political stability. Among the important measures that are being discussed but have not yet been introduced are increasing the pension age (at present, 60 and 55 years old for men and reducing the employee categories entitled to early retirement. This uncertainty affects the --Third, the structure of federal budget expenditures is deteriorating. 10 For example, Russia still spends little on enhancing the quality of human capital and life (education, health care, infrastructure, environment) and allocates the same or even more money for the militaryindustrial complex, army, police, and transfers to the Pension Fund.
11
The enumerated arguments prove that even if the cyclical crisis is overcome, oil prices recover, and the sanctions are canceled (relaxed), with the existing growth model, Russia is unlikely in the near-term to return to growth rates of 3.0-3.5% per year. There are discus-model (see, for example, Kudrin and Gurvich, 2014; Idrisov and Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2014;  impossible to increase structural growth rates (not necessarily sensitive to short-term downturns or changes in external market conditions) without implementing an effective anti-crisis policy. Still, to ensure that the current crisis does not turn into a protracted economic stag--ing social targets:
increasing the life expectancy at birth by three years compared with 2014; 2014, to 20th place (in 2014, Portugal, Germany and Greece had similar positions);
place (in 2013, Spain had a similar position).
